A mediator can help non-cooperative agents obtain an equilibrium that may otherwise not be possible. We study the ability of players to obtain the same equilibrium without a mediator, using only cheap talk, that is, nonbinding pre-play communication. Previous work has considered this problem in a synchronous setting. Here we consider the effect of asynchrony on the problem, and provide upper bounds for implementing mediators. Considering asynchronous environments introduces new subtleties, including exactly what solution concept is most appropriate and determining what move is played if the cheap talk goes on forever. Different results are obtained depending on whether the move after such "infinite play" is under the control of the players or part of the description of the game.
Introduction
Having a trusted mediator often makes solving a problem much easier. For example, a problem such as Byzantine agreement becomes trivial with a mediator: agents can just send their initial input to the mediator, and the mediator sends the majority value back to all the agents, which they then output. Not surprisingly, the question of whether a problem in a multiagent system that can be solved with a trusted mediator can be solved by just the agents in the system, without the mediator, has attracted a great deal of attention in both computer science (particularly in the cryptography community) and game theory. In cryptography, the focus has been on secure multiparty computation [11, 14] . Here it is assumed that each agent i has some private information x i . Fix functions f 1 , . . . , f n . The goal is to have agent i learn f i (x 1 , . . . , x n ) without learning anything about x j for j = i beyond what is revealed by the value of f i (x 1 , . . . , x n ). With a trusted mediator, this is trivial: each agent i just gives the mediator its private value x i ; the mediator then sends each agent i the value f i (x 1 , . . . , x n ). Work on multiparty computation provides conditions under which this can be done in a synchronous system [6, 11, 13, 14] and in an asynchronous system [5, 7] . In game theory, the focus has been on whether an equilibrium in a game with a mediator can be implemented using what is called cheap talk -that is, just by players communicating among themselves.
In the computer science literature, the interest has been in performing multiparty computation in the presence of possibly malicious adversaries, who do everything they can to subvert the computation. On the other hand, in the game theory literature, the assumption is that players have preferences and seek to maximize their utility; thus, they will subvert the computation iff it is in their best interests to do so. In [1, 2] (denoted ADGH and ADH, respectively, in the rest of the paper), it was argued that it is important to consider deviations by both rational players, who have preferences and try to maximize them, and players that we can view as malicious, although it is perhaps better to think of them as rational players whose utilities are not known by the mechanism designer (or other players). ADGH and ADH considered equilibria that are (k, t)-robust; roughly speaking, this means that the equilibrium tolerates deviations by up to k rational players, whose utilities are presumed known, and up to t players with unknown utilities. Tight bounds were proved on the ability to implement a (k, t)-robust equilibrium in the game with a mediator using cheap talk in synchronous systems. These bounds depend on, among other things, (a) the relationship between k, t and n, the total number of players in the system; (b) whether players know the exact utilities of the rational players; and (c) whether the game has a punishment strategy, where an m-punishment strategy is a strategy profile that, if used by all but at most m players, guarantees that every player gets a worse outcome than they do with the equilibrium strategy. The following is a high-level overview of results proved in the synchronous setting that will be of most relevance here. For these results, we assume that the communication with the mediator is bounded, it lasts for at most N rounds, and that the mediator can be represented by an arithmetic circuit of depth c.
R1. If n > 3k + 3t, then a mediator can be implemented using cheap talk; no punishment strategy is required, no knowledge of other agents' utilities is required, and the cheaptalk protocol has bounded running time O(nNc), independent of the utilities.
R2. If n > 2k +3t, then a mediator can be implemented using cheap talk if there is a (k +t)-punishment strategy and the utilities of the rational players are known; the cheap-talk protocol has expected running time O(nNc). (In R2, unlike R1, the cheap-talk game may be unbounded, although it has finite expected running time.)
In ADH, lower bounds are presented that match the upper bounds above. Thus, for example, it is shown that n > 3k + 3t is necessary in R1; if n ≤ 3k + 3t, then we cannot implement a mediator in general if we do not have a punishment strategy or if the utilities are unknown. The proofs of the upper bounds make heavy use of the fact that the setting is synchronous. Here we consider the impact of asynchrony on these results. Once we introduce asynchrony, we must revisit the question of what it even means to implement an equilibrium using cheap talk. Notions like (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium implicitly assume that all uncertainty is described probabilistically. Having a probability is necessary to talk about an agent's expected utility, given that a certain strategy profile is played. If we were willing to put a distribution on how long messages take to arrive and on when agents are scheduled to move, then we could apply notions like Nash equilibrium without difficulty. However, it is notoriously difficult to quantify this uncertainty. The typical approach used to analyze algorithms in the presence of uncertainty that is not quantified probabilistically is to assume that all the non-probabilistic uncertainty is resolved by the environment according to some strategy. Thus, the environment uses some strategy to decide when each agent will be allowed to play and how long each message takes to be delivered. The algorithm is then proved correct no matter what strategy the environment is following in some class of strategies. For example, we might restrict the environment's strategy to being fair, so that every agent eventually gets a chance to move. (See [12] for a discussion of this approach and further references. ) We follow this approach in the context of games. Note that once we fix the environment's strategy, we have an ordinary game, where uncertainty is quantified by probability. In this setting, we can consider what is called ex post equilibrium. A strategy is an ex post equilibrium if it is an equilibrium no matter what strategy the environment uses. Ex post equilibrium is a strong notion, but, as we show by example, it can often be attained with the help of a mediator. We believe that it is the closest analogue to Nash equilibrium in an asynchronous setting.
Another issue that plays a major role in an asynchronous setting is what happens if the strategies of players result in some players being livelocked, talking indefinitely without making a move in the underlying game, or in some players being deadlocked, waiting indefinitely without moving in the underlying game. We consider two approaches for dealing with this problem. One way to decide what action to assign to a player that fails to make a decision in the cheap-talk phase is the default-move approach. In this approach, as part of the description of the game, there is a default move for each player which is imposed if that player fails to explicitly make a move in the cheap-talk phase. Aumann and Hart [4] considered a different approach, which we henceforth call the AH approach, where a player's strategy in the underlying game is a function of the (possibly infinite) history of the player in the cheap-talk phase. We can think of this almost as a player writing a will, describing what he would like to do (as a function of the history) if the game ends before he has had a chance to move.
We believe that both the AH approach and the default-move approach are reasonable in different contexts. The AH approach makes sense if the agent can leave instructions that will be carried out by an "executor" if the cheap-talk game deadlocks. But if we consider a game-theoretic variant of Byzantine agreement, it seems more reasonable to say that if a malicious agent can prevent an agent from making a move in finite time, the agent should not get a chance to make a move after the cheap-talk phase has ended.
Our results show that, in the worst case, the cost of asynchrony is an extra k + t in the bounds on n, but we can sometimes save k or even k + t if there is a punishment strategy or if we are willing to tolerate an ǫ "error". For example, with both the AH approach and the default-move approach, if the utilities are not known, we can implement a mediator using asynchronous cheap talk if n > 4k + 4t. Thus, compared to R1, we need an extra k + t. However, if we are willing to accept a small probability of error, so that rather than implementing the mediator we get only an ǫ-implementation, and are also willing to accept ǫ-(k,t)-robustness (which, roughly speaking, means that players get within ǫ of the best they could get), then we can do this if n > 3k + 3t, again, using both the AH approach and the default-move approach.
Just as in the synchronous case, we can do better if we assume that there is a punishment strategy and utilities are known (as in R2). Specifically, with the AH approach, we can implement a mediator if n > 3k + 4t (compared to n > 2k + 3t in the synchronous case, and can ǫ-implement a mediator if n > 2k + 3t. We use the punishment to deal with deadlock. If a good player is waiting for a message that never arrives, then the waiting player instructs his executor to carry out a punishment in his will. Having a punishment does not seem to help in the default-move approach unless the default move is a punishment; if it is, then we can get the same results as with the AH approach.
If there is a punishment strategy, these results significantly improve those of Even, Goldreich, and Lempel [9] . They provide a protocol with similar properties, but the expected number of messages sent is O(1/ǫ); with a punishment strategy, a bounded number of messages is sent, with the bound being independent of ǫ.
Definitions
Asynchronous games, mediator games, and cheap talk: We are interested in implementing mediators. Formally, this means we need to consider three games: an underlying game Γ, an extension Γ d of Γ with a mediator, and an extension Γ CT of Γ with (asynchronous) cheap-talk. We assume that Γ is a normal-form Bayesian game: each player has a type t taken from some type space T i , such that there is a commonly known distribution on T ⊆ T 1 × · · · × T n , the set of types; each player i chooses an action a ∈ A i , the set of actions of agent i; player i's utility u i is determined by the type profile of the players and the actions they take. A strategy for player i in the Bayesian game is just a function T i to A i , which tells player i what to do, given his type. If A = A 1 × · · · × A n , then a strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) can be viewed as a function σ : T → ∆(A) (where, as usual, ∆(X) denotes the set of probability distributions on X).
The basic notions of a game with a mediator, a cheap-talk game, and implementation are standard in the game-theory literature. However, since we consider them in an asynchronous setting, we must modify the definitions somewhat.
We first define asynchronous games. In an asynchronous game, we assume that players alternate making moves with the environment-first the environment moves, then a player moves, then the environment moves, and so on. The environment's move consists of choosing a player i to move next and a set of messages in transit to i that will be delivered just before i moves (so that i's move can depend on the messages i receives). The environment is subject to two constraints: all messages sent must eventually be delivered and, for all times m and players i, if i is still playing the game at time m, then there must be some time m ′ ≥ m that i is chosen to move. We can describe an asynchronous game by a game tree. Associated with each non-leaf node or history is either a player-the player whose move it is at that node-or the environment (which can make a randomized move). The nodes where a player i moves are further partitioned into information sets; intuitively, these are nodes that player i cannot tell apart. We assume that the environment has complete information, so that the environment's information sets just consist of the singletons. A strategy for player i is a (possibly randomized) function from i's information sets to actions; we can similarly define a strategy for the environment. We can essentially view the environment strategy as defining a scheduler (and thus we sometimes refer to an environment strategy as a scheduler).
For our results, we start with an n-player Bayesian game Γ in normal form (called the underlying game), with {1, . . . , n} being the set of players, and then consider two types of games that extend Γ. A game Γ ′ extends Γ if the players have initial types from the same type space as Γ, with the same distribution over types; moreover, in each path of the game tree for Γ ′ , the players send and receive messages, and perform at most one action from Γ. In a history where each player makes a move from Γ, each player gets the same utility as in Γ (where the utility is a function of the moves made and the types). That leaves open the question of what happens in a complete history of Γ ′ where some players do not make a move in Γ. As we suggested in the introduction, we consider two approaches to dealing with this. In the first approach, we assume that the description of Γ ′ includes a function M i for each player i that maps player i's type to a move in Γ. In an infinite history h where i has type t and does not make a move in Γ, i is viewed as having made move M i (t). We can then define each player's utility in h as above. This is the default-move approach. In the AH approach, we extend the notion of strategy so that i's strategy in Γ ′ also describes what move i makes in the underlying game Γ in any infinite history h where i has not made a move in Γ. In the AH approach, i's move in h is under i's control; in the default-move approach, it is not.
Given an underlying Bayesian game Γ (which we assume is synchronous-the players move simultaneously), we will be interested in two types of extensions. A mediator game extending Γ is an asynchronous game where players can send messages to and receive messages from a mediator (who can be viewed as a trusted third party) as well as making a move in Γ; "good" or "honest" players do not send messages to each other, but "bad" players (i.e., one of the k rational deviating players or one of the t "malicious" players with unknown utilities) may send messages to each other as well as to the mediator. We assume that the space of possible messages that can be sent in a mediator game is fixed and finite.
In an asynchronous cheap-talk game extending Γ, there is no mediator. Players send messages to each other via asynchronous channels, as well as making a move in Γ. We assume that each pair of agents communicates over an asynchronous secure private channel (the fact that the channels are secure means that an adversary cannot eavesdrop on conversations between the players). We assume that each player can identify the sender of each message. Finally, we assume that in both the mediator game and the cheap-talk game, when a player is first scheduled, it gets a signal that the game has started (either an external signal from the environment, or a game-related message from another player or the mediator).
Implementation: In the synchronous setting, a strategy profile σ ′ in a cheap-talk Γ CT extending an underlying game Γ implements a strategy σ in a mediator game Γ d extending Γ if σ and σ ′ correspond to the same strategy in Γ; that is, they induce the same function from T to ∆(A). The notion of implementation is more complicated in an asynchronous setting, because the probability on action profiles also depends on the environment strategy. Because Γ CT and Γ d are quite different games, the environment's strategies in Γ CT are quite different from those in Γ d . So we now say that σ ′ implements σ if the set of distributions on actions profiles in Γ induced by σ and all possible choices of environment strategy is the same as that induced by σ ′ and all possible choices of environment strategy. More precisely, let S Γ ′ ,e and S Γ ′′ ,e denote the the set of environment strategies in Γ ′ and Γ ′′ , respectively. A strategy σ e ∈ S Γ ′ ,e and a strategy profile σ for the players in Γ ′ together induce a function ( σ, σ e ) from T to ∆(A). A strategy profile σ
Since the outcome that arises if the players use a particular strategy may depend on what the environment does, this says that the set of outcomes that can result if the players use σ ′ is the same as the set of outcomes that can result if the players use σ ′′ . For some of our results, we cannot get an exact implementation; there may be some error. Given two discrete distributions π and π ′ on some space S, the distance between π and π ′ , denoted dist(π, π ′ ), is at most ǫ if s∈S |π(s) − π ′ (s)| ≤ ǫ. As we observed earlier, in the mediator game and the cheap-talk game, Recall that a strategy profile σ for the players and a strategy σ e for the environment together induce a mapping from type profiles to ∆(A). We lift the notion of distance to such function by defining dist(( σ, σ e )), ( ′′ that cannot be simulated by σ ′ . As we shall see, this may actually be a feature: we can sometimes simulate the effect of only "good" schedulers. In any case, note that in the synchronous setting, implementation and weak implementation coincide. We can also define a notion of weak ǫ-implementation in the obvious way; we leave the details to the reader.
Termination: We will be interested in asynchronous games where, almost surely, the honest players stop sending messages and make a move in the underlying game. In the mediator games that we consider, this happens after only a bounded number of messages have been sent. But even with this bound, there may not be a point in a history when players know that they can stop sending messages; although a player i may have moved in the underlying game, i may still need to keep checking for incoming message, and may need to respond to them, to ensure that other players can make the appropriate move.
For some of our results, we must assume that, in the mediator game, there comes a point when all honest players know that they have terminated the protocol; they will not get further messages from the mediator and can stop sending messages to the mediator, and should make a move in the underlying game if they have not done so yet. For simplicity, for these results, we restrict the honest players and the mediator to using strategy profiles that have the following canonical form: Using a canonical strategy, player i sends a message to the mediator in response to a message from the mediator that does not include "STOP" if it has not halted, and these are the only messages that i sends, in addition to an initial message to the mediator. If player i gets a message from the mediator that includes "STOP", then i makes a move in the underlying game and halts. We assume that, as long as the honest players and mediator follow their part of the canonical strategy profile, there is a constant r such that, no matter what strategy the rational and malicious players and the environment use, the mediator sends each player i at most r messages in each history, and the final message includes "STOP". We conjecture that the assumption that players and mediator are using a strategy in canonical form in the mediator game is without loss of generality; that is, a (k, t)-robust strategy profile in a mediator game Γ d can be implemented by a (k, t)-robust strategy profile in Γ d that is in canonical form. However, we have not proved this conjecture yet.
Solution concepts
In this section, we review the solution concepts introduced in ADGH and extend them to asynchronous settings.
Note that in an asynchronous game Γ, the utility of a player i can depend not only on the strategies of the agents, but on what the environment does. Since we consider an underlying game, a mediator game, and a cheap-talk game, it is useful to include explicitly in the utility function which game is being considered. Thus, we write u i (Γ, σ, σ d , σ e , x) to denote the expected utility of player i in game Γ when players play strategy profile σ, the mediator plays σ d , the environment plays σ e , and the type profile is x. We typically say "input profile" rather than "type profile", since in our setting, the type of player i is just i's initial input. Note that if Γ is the underlying game, the σ e component is unnecessary, since the underlying game is assumed to be synchronous. We occasionally omit the mediator strategy σ d when it is clear from context. Given a type space T , a set K of players, and x ∈ T , let T (
If Γ is a Bayesian game over type space T , σ is a strategy profile in Γ, and Pr is the probability on the type space T , let
Thus, u i (Γ, σ, σ e , x K ) is i's expected payoff if everyone uses strategy σ and type profiles are in T ( x K ). k-resilient equilibrium: In a standard game, a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player can gain any advantage by using a different strategy, given that all the other players do not change their strategies. The notion of k-resilient equilibrium extends Nash equilibrium to allow for coalitions.
Definition 3.1. σ is a k-resilient equilibrium (resp., strongly k-resilient equilibrium) in an asynchronous game Γ if, for all subsets K of players with 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k, all strategy profiles τ K for the players in K, all type profiles x ∈ T , and all strategies σ e of the environment,
Thus, σ is k-resilient if, no matter what the environment does, no subset K of at most k players can all do better by deviating, even if they share their type information (so that if the true type is x, the players in K know x K ). It is strongly k-resilient if not even one of the players in K can do better if all the players in K deviate.
For some of our results we will be interested in equilibria that are "almost" k-resilient, in the sense that no player in a coalition can do more than ǫ better if the coalition its strategy, for some small ǫ. Definition 3.2. For ǫ > 0, σ is an ǫ-k-resilient equilibrium (resp., strongly ǫ-k-resilient equilibrium) if, for all subsets K of players, all strategy profiles τ K for the players in K, all type profiles x ∈ T , and all strategies σ e of the environment, we have
Note that we have "< u i (Γ, σ, σ e , x K ) + ǫ" here, not "≤"; this means that a 0-k-resilient equilibrium is not a k-resilient equilibrium. However, an equilibrium is k-resilient iff it is ǫ-k-resilient for all ǫ > 0. We have used this slightly nonstandard definition to make the statements of our theorems cleaner.
Robustness: A standard assumption in game theory is that utilities are (commonly) known; when we are given a game we are also given each player's utility. When players make decision, they can take other players' utilities into account. However, in large systems, it seems almost invariably the case that there will be some fraction of users who do not respond to incentives the way we expect. For example, in a peer-to-peer network like Kazaa or Gnutella, it would seem that no rational agent should share files. Whether or not you can get a file depends only on whether other people share files; on the other hand, it seems that there are disincentives for sharing (the possibility of lawsuits, use of bandwidth, etc.). Nevertheless, people do share files. However, studies of the Gnutella network have shown almost 70 percent of users share no files and nearly 50 percent of responses are from the top 1 percent of sharing hosts [3] .
It seems important to design protocols that tolerate such unanticipated behaviors, so that the payoffs of the users who follow the recommended strategy do not get affected by players who deviate, provided that not too many deviate. Definition 3.3. A strategy profile σ is t-immune in a game Γ if, for all subsets T of players with |T | ≤ t, all strategy profiles τ , all i / ∈ T , all type profiles x ∈ T , and all strategies σ e of the environment, we have
Intuitively, σ is t-immune if there is nothing that player in a set T of size at most t can do to give the players not in T a worse payoff, even if the players in T share their type information.
The notion of t-immunity and k-resilience address different concerns. For t-immunity, we consider the payoffs of the players K. It is natural to combine both notions. Given a strategy profile τ , let Γ T τ be the game which is identical to Γ except that the players in T are fixed to playing strategy τ T . Definition 3.4. σ is a (strongly) (k, t)-robust equilibrium in a game Γ if σ is t-immune and, for all subsets T of players with |T | ≤ t and all strategy profiles τ ,
We can define "approximate" notions of t-immunity and (k, t)-robustness analogous to Definition 3.2: Definition 3.5. For ǫ > 0, a strategy profile σ is ǫ-t-immune in Γ if, for all subsets T of players with |T | ≤ t, all strategy profiles τ , all i / ∈ T , all type profiles x ∈ T , and all strategies σ e of the environment, we have
and, for all subsets T of players with |T | ≤ t and strategy profiles
Main theorems: formal statements
In this section, we state our results formally. Just as with R1 and R2, for these results we assume that the communication in the mediator game is bounded. But since "rounds" is not meaningful in asynchronous systems, we express the bounds in terms of number of messages. Specifically, we assume that at most N messages are sent in all histories of the mediator game, and that the mediator can be represented by an arithmetic circuit with at most c gates.
We begin with a result that is an analogue of R1 in the asynchronous setting. We say that a game Γ ′ is a utility variant of a game Γ if Γ ′ and Γ have the same game tree, but the utilities of the players may be different in Γ and Γ ′ . We use the notation Γ( u) if we want to emphasize that u is the utility function in game Γ. We then take Γ( u ′ ) to be the utility variant of Γ with utility function u ′ . One more technical comment before stating the theorems: in the mediator game we can also view the mediator as a player (albeit one without a utility function) that is following a strategy. Thus, when we talk about a strategy profile that is a (k, t)-robust equilibrium in the mediator game, we must give the mediator's strategy as well as the players' strategies. We sometimes write σ + σ d if we want to distinguish the players' strategy profile σ from the mediator's strategy σ d . We occasionally abuse notation and drop the σ d if it is clear from context, and just talk about σ being a (k, t)-robust equilibrium.
Theorem 4.1. If Γ is a normal-form Bayesian game with n players, σ + σ d is a strategy profile for the players and the mediator in an asynchronous mediator game Γ d that extends Γ, and n > 4k + 4t, then with both the default-move approach and the AH approach, there exists a strategy profile σ CT that implements σ +σ d in the asynchronous cheap-talk game Γ CT such that for all utility variants
, and the number of messages sent in a history of σ CT is O(nNc), independent of u ′ .
The proof of Theorem 4.1 uses ideas from the multiparty computation protocol of Ben-Or, Canetti, and Goldreich [5] (BCG from now on). Our construction actually needs stronger properties than these provided by BCG; we show that we can get protocols with these stronger properties in a companion paper [10] ; see Section 5 for further discussion.
We can obtain better bounds if we are willing to accept ǫ-equilibrium, using ideas due to Ben-Or, Kelmer, and Rabin [7] . Theorem 4.2. If Γ is a normal-form Bayesian game with n players, σ + σ d is a strategy profile for the players and mediator in an asynchronous mediator game Γ d that extends Γ, M > 0, and n > 3k + 3t, then with both the default-move approach and the AH approach, for all ǫ > 0, there exists a strategy profile σ CT in the asynchronous cheap-talk game Γ CT that ǫ-implements σ such that for all utility variants
, where the range of u
If we have a punishment strategy and utilities are known, we can do better with the AH approach. To make this precise, we need the definition of an m-punishment strategy [1] (which generalizes the notion of punishment strategy defined by Ben Porath [8] ). Before defining this carefully, note that in an asynchronous setting (i.e., in the mediator game and the cheap-talk game, but not in the underlying game), the utility of players depends on the environment's strategy as well as the players' strategy profile and the players' type profile.
Definition 4.3. If Γ
′ is an extension of an underlying game Γ, a strategy profile ρ in Γ is a k-punishment strategy with respect to a strategy profile σ ′ in Γ ′ if for all subsets K of players with 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k, all strategy profiles σ in Γ, all strategies σ e for the environment, all type profiles x ∈ T , and all players i ∈ K, we have
Thus, if ρ is a k-punishment strategy with respect to σ ′ , if all but k players play their part of ρ in the underlying tame, then all of the remaining players will be worse off than they would be in Γ ′ if everyone had played σ ′ , no matter what they do in the underlying game.
Theorem 4.4. If Γ is a normal-form Bayesian game with n players, σ + σ d is a strategy profile in canonical form for the players and mediator in an asynchronous mediator game Γ d that extends Γ, there is a (k + t)-punishment strategy with respect to σ + σ d , and n > 3k + 4t, then with the AH approach, there exists a strategy profile σ CT that implements σ + σ d in the asynchronous cheap-talk game Γ CT , and if σ + σ d is a (strongly) (k, t)-robust equilibrium in Γ d , then σ CT is a (strongly) (k, t)-robust equilibrium in Γ CT . If there exists a strong (k + t)-punishment strategy or we require only that σ CT is a weak implementation, then the number of messages in a history of σ CT is O(nc) (and σ CT continues to be a (strongly
Note that in Theorem 4.4, the running time of the algorithm is significantly affected by whether we want σ CT to implement σ or whether a weak implementation suffices.
If we assume both that there is a (2k + 2t)-punishment strategy and that utilities are known, we can get an analogue to R2, but with an ǫ error. Theorem 4.5. If Γ is a normal-form Bayesian game with n players, σ + σ d is a strategy profile in canonical form for the players and mediator in an asynchronous mediator game Γ d that extends Γ, there is a (2k+2t)-punishment strategy with respect to σ+σ d , and n > 2k+3t, then with the AH approach, for all ǫ > 0 there is a strategy σ CT that ǫ-implements σ in the asynchronous cheap-talk game Γ CT such that if σ + σ d is a (strongly) (k, t)-robust equilibrium in Γ d , then σ CT is a (strongly) ǫ-(k, t)-robust equilibrium in Γ CT , and the number of messages sent in a history of σ CT is O(n2 N c). If there exists a strong (k, t)-punishment strategy or we require only that σ CT is a weak implementation, then the number of messages in a history of σ CT is O(nc) (and σ CT continues to be a (strongly) (k, t)-robust equilibrium in Γ CT if σ is a (strongly) (k, t)-robust equilibrium in Γ d ).
We prove these results using ideas in the spirit of ADGH, but much more care must be taken to deal with asynchrony. Among other things, we need stronger security guarantees than are traditionally provided for multiparty communication; see Section 5 for details. We provide proofs of all the results in Section 6.
t-bisimulation and t-emulation
To construct the cheap-talk protocol for Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, we use ideas from a companion paper [10] , where we provide constructions that extend the security guarantees given by the multi-party computation protocols for the synchronous case by Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson [6] (BGW from now on) and the asynchronous case by Ben-Or, Canetti, and Goldreich [5] (BCG from now on). We briefly review the main details here.
BGW/BCG show that if a function f of n inputs provided by n players can be computed using a mediator, then it can be computed by the players without the mediator and without revealing any information beyond the function value, even when some of the players are malicious. BGW deals with the synchronous case and tolerates up to n/3 malicious players, while BCG deals with the asynchronous case and tolerates up to n/4. The notion of not revealing any information is made precise by defining a set of ideal distributions over possible values of the function, and ensuring that the real distribution is identically distributed to one of those (see BGW and BCG for formal definitions and details).
We can view a mediator game as computing an action profile in the underlying game; the ideal distributions are the possible distributions over action profiles when the honest players play their component of the (k, t)-robust equilibrium strategy profile in the mediator game. BCG's protocol then essentially gives us a strategy in the cheap-talk game. However, the BCG protocol is not sufficient for our purposes for two reasons: it does not guarantee that the real protocol is an implementation of the ideal protocol in the sense of the definition in Section 2 (although it does suffice for weak implementation), nor does it guarantee that the protocol is a (k, t)-robust equilibrium. To prove these stronger results, we show that σ CT can be constructed so as to satisfy some additional security properties, which we now define. • for all adversaries A = ( τ T , σ e ), there exists an adversary
• for all adversaries
For one direction of the simulation, we need an even tighter correspondence between deviations in the cheap-talk game and deviations in the mediator game. This is made precise in the following definition. There are two significant differences between t-bisimulation and t-emulation. As the name suggests, with t-bisimulation, we require simulation in both directions (for every τ and σ e there is a τ ′ and σ ′ e , and vice versa); for emulation, we have only one direction. On the other hand, with t-emulation, the strategy τ ′ i depends only on τ i and σ e , whereas with t-bisimulation, τ ′ i can also depend on σ ′ e and all the strategies in τ . Note that 0-bisimulation is equivalent to implementation, while 0-emulation is equivalent to weak implementation. Implementation and weak implementation consider only what happens when there is no malicious behavior; bisimulation and emulation generalize these notions by taking malicious behavior into account. For some of our results (specifically, Theorems 4.1 and 4.2), we use these notions, and show that they are achievable under the conditions of these theorems. In fact, although we don't need it for our proof, we can show that we can get t-bisimulation and t-emulation under the conditions of Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 as well. We briefly comment on how this can be done when we present the proof.
We have required schedulers to deliver each message eventually. Because we assume that protocols in the mediator game are bounded, all protocols in the mediator game must terminate. This means that we can't hope to emulate a protocol in the cheap-talk game that deadlocks. (We assume that if the protocol deadlocks, it has a special output that we denote ⊥. Given our constraints, we can never get an output of ⊥ in the mediator game.) To deal with this situation, we relax this requirement on schedulers somewhat, but only in the mediator game. We take a relaxed scheduler to be one that may never deliver some messages. However, we require that if the mediator sends several messages at the same step, then a relaxed scheduler either delivers all of them or none of them. (There is no requirement on messages sent by the players, since they send messages only to the mediator, and we can assume without loss of generality that they send only one message at each step.) We can define relaxed t-emulation just as we defined t-emulation, except that we now allow the scheduler σ e in the definition to be a relaxed scheduler. Finally, we define (t, t ′ )-emulation just as we defined relaxed t-emulation except that σ e must be non-relaxed if |T | ≤ t ′ . We need a further property to deal with protocols that involve punishment strategies. For a punishment strategy to be effective, all the honest players have to play it. In our protocols, the punishment strategy is played when there is a deadlock (so some players never terminate); that is, the punishment strategy is in the honest players' "wills". Thus, we want it to be the case that either none of the honest players terminate (in which case the punishment strategy will be effective) or all of them terminate; we do not want it to be the case that only some of the honest players terminate.
Definition 5.3 (t-cotermination).
A protocol π t-coterminates if, for all schedulers σ e , all subsets T of at most t players, and all strategy profiles τ T for the players in T , in all histories of the protocol ( π −T , τ T , σ e ), either all the players not in T terminate or none of them do.
For some of our results, we need "approximate" versions of t-bisimulation, t-emulation, relaxed t-emulation, and t-cotermination that allow an ǫ probability of error. For t-bisimulation, t-emulation, (t, t ′ )-emulation, and relaxed t-emulation, this means that the distance between the distribution over outputs in the cheap-talk game and the distribution in the mediator game is at most ǫ (where the notion of distance is that used in the definition of ǫ-implementation in Section 2) while for t-cotermination it means that the property holds with probability 1 − ǫ. We call these properties (ǫ, t)-bisimulation, (ǫ, t)-emulation, relaxed (ǫ, t)-emulation and (ǫ, t)-cotermination.
In [10] , the following results are proved:
Theorem 5.4. Given a mediator game Γ d extending Γ and a strategy profile σ + σ d , there exists a strategy profile σ CT for Γ CT such that σ CT t-coterminates, t-emulates (resp., relaxed (t, t ′ )-emulates), and t-bisimulates σ + σ d if t < n/3, t < n/4 (resp., t < n/3 and t ′ < n/4), and t < n/4 respectively, and the expected number of messages in histories of σ CT is O(nNc).
Theorem 5.5. Given a mediator game Γ d extending Γ, a strategy profile σ + σ d in Γ d , and a real number ǫ ∈ (0, 1], there exists a strategy profile σ CT in Γ CT such that σ CT (ǫ, t)-coterminates, (ǫ, t)-emulates (resp., (ǫ, t, t ′ )-emulates), and (ǫ, t)-bisimulates σ + σ d if t < n/2, t < n/3 (resp., t < n/2 and t ′ < n/3) and t < n/3 respectively, and the expected number of messages in histories of σ CT is O(nNc).
Proofs of the main theorems 6.1 Coordination between the environment and malicious players
Before proving the main results, it is useful to understand some of the implication of (k, t)-robustness, particularly when it comes to the interactions between the environment and the malicious and rational players. The definition of (k, t)-robustness requires that the rational players have no profitable deviation no matter what the malicious players and the environment do. It may seem a priori that the malicious players, the rational players, and the environment all act independently, but in fact, we can assume without loss of generality that they are all under the control of a single adversary. Clearly rational players can coordinate by sending messages to each other. But it may not be obvious that the malicious and rational players can also coordinate with the environment so that, for example, the malicious and rational players can act knowing who will be scheduled when and the environment can schedule rational and malicious players based on their inputs. Nevertheless, this follows from the fact that (k, t)-robustness must hold for all schedulers. We prove this by showing that rational and malicious players can effectively communicate with the environment, even though the environment cannot read messages.
To see that a player i can communicate with the environment, recall that we have assumed that the message space is finite, say {m 0 , . . . , m M }. Immediately after sending m j , i sends j empty messages to itself. So, even though the environment cannot read the messages, it will know that i received m j .
2 (Clearly the environment will also know who sent the message, since the environment delivered the message.)
The rational and malicious players know the environment's protocol (and thus know when a message that is sent will be delivered). Thus, it suffices for the environment to tell the non-honest players when the kth message is sent, who sent it, and who the intended recipient is. All the non-honest players i initially send themselves (n + 1) 2 empty messages. If the first message was sent by player j 1 to player j 2 (treating the mediator as player 0 in the mediator game), then the environment delivers (n + 1)j 1 + j 2 of these empty messages. Then player i sends another (n + 1) 2 empty messages, allowing the environment to encode the sender and receiver of the next message, if there is one.
Because schedulers can collude with the adversary, t-immune strategy profiles satisfy an even stronger condition: deviations by players in a set T with |T | ≤ t do not make things worse for the non-deviating players even if the environment colludes with the players in T .
Proposition 6.1. If σ is t-immune, then for all sets T of players with |T | ≤ t, strategies σ e and σ ′ e for the environment, strategy profiles τ T for the players in T , input profiles x and x ′ , and players i / ∈ T , we have
Proof. Clearly, if (1) holds for all σ e , σ ′ e , x, and x ′ , then σ is t-immune. For the converse, suppose by way of contradiction that σ is t-immunte but for some T , τ , σ e , σ 
contradicting the assumption that σ is t-immune. The details for the proof are left A similar argument shows that (k, t)-robust strategy profiles satisfy a correspondingly stronger condition, made precise in the following proposition: Proposition 6.2. A strategy profile σ is (k, t)-robust (resp., strongly (k, t)-robust) if and only if it is t-immune and for all disjoint sets K and T with 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k and |T | ≤ t, all strategy profiles τ K , τ T , and τ ′ T for the players in K and T , respectively, all environment strategies σ e and σ ′ e , and all input profiles x and x ′ , we have that
for some i ∈ K (resp., for all i ∈ K).
Proof. Again, it is clear that if (2) holds for all K and T with 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k and |T | ≤ t, all τ K , τ T , τ ′ T , x, and x ′ , and some (resp., all) i ∈ K, then σ is (strongly) (k, t)-robust. For the converse, assume by way of contradiction that σ is (k, t)-robust, but for some disjoint sets K and T with 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k and |T | ≤ t, τ K , τ T , τ ′ T , x, and x ′ , and all i ∈ K, (2) does not hold. Again, we use the fact that the rational players can effectively communicate with malicious players and with the scheduler. Consider a scheduler σ ′′ e that acts like σ e unless some player sends a message to itself, in which case it acts like σ ′ e and a strategy profile τ ′′ T in which each i ∈ T acts as if it was using strategy (τ T ) i , except that it switches to (τ ′ T ) i and to pretend have input x ′ i if it receives a message from a rational player asking it to do so. Then, given input profile x, strategy profile τ ′′ T for T , and scheduler σ ′′ e , player i can gain by sending a message to itself and sending a message to players in T asking them to follow τ ′ T and pretends to have input x ′ T , and by making players in K play τ K as if they had input x ′ K , rather than playing σ. This contradicts the assumption that σ is (k, t)-robust. The argument for strong (k, t)-robustness.
Another property interesting in its own right that follows from this argument is that (k, t)-robust strategies must be scheduler-proof : the expected payoff for all players is the same regardless of the scheduler: Corollary 6.3. If σ is (k, t)-robust for some k ≥ 1, then for all sets T with |T | ≤ t, strategy profiles τ T for the players in T , environment strategies σ e and σ ′ e , input profiles x, and players i / ∈ T , we have
We have analogous strengthenings of ǫ-t-immunity and ǫ-(k, t)-robustness. The proofs are essentially identical to that of Proposition 6.1, so we omit them here.
Proposition 6.4. If ǫ > 0 and σ is ǫ-t-immune in game Γ, then for all sets T of players with |T | ≤ t, strategy profiles τ T for the players in T , environment strategies σ e and σ ′ e , input profiles x and x ′ , and players i / ∈ T , we have that
Proposition 6.5. A strategy profile σ is ǫ-(k, t)-robust (resp., strongly ǫ-(k, t)-robust) in game Γ if and only if it is ǫ-t-immune and, for all disjoint sets K and T of players with 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k and |T | ≤ t, all strategy profiles τ K and τ T for players in K and T , respectively, all environment strategies σ e and σ ′ e , and all input profiles x and x ′ , we have that
It will be useful for our later results that we can actually improve on the bound of ǫ in Propositions 6.4 and 6.5. Proposition 6.6. If σ is an ǫ-t-immune strategy in a finite game Γ, then there exists ǫ 0 with 0 < ǫ 0 < ǫ such that for all sets of players T with |T | ≤ t, strategy profiles τ T for the players in T , environment strategies σ e and σ ′ e , input profiles x and x ′ , and players i / ∈ T , we have that
Proof. Since, by Proposition 6.4, for each choice of τ T , σ e , and σ ′ e , we have
and the space of player strategy profiles, environment strategies, and input value profiles is compact, if we take the sup of the left-hand side over all choices of strategy profiles τ T , environment strategies σ e and σ ′ e , and input profiles x and x ′ , it takes on some maximum value ǫ 1 < ǫ 0 . We can then take ǫ 0 = (ǫ + ǫ 1 )/2. Using Proposition 6.5, we get a similar result for ǫ-(k, t)-robustness. The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 6.6. Proposition 6.7. If Γ is a finite game and σ is a (strongly) ǫ-(k, t)-robust strategy in Γ d , then there exists ǫ 0 with 0 < ǫ 0 < ǫ such that for all disjoint sets K and T of players with 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k and |T | ≤ t, all strategy profiles τ K and τ T for players in K and T , respectively, all environment strategies σ e and σ ′ e , and all input profiles x and x ′ , we have that
for some i ∈ K (resp., all i ∈ K).
Proof of Theorem 4.1
By Theorem 5.4, if n > 4k+4t, there exists a strategy σ CT that (k+t)-bisimulates and (k+t)-emulates σ + σ d , in which the expected number of messages is O(nNc). It is immediate from the definition of (k + t)-bisimulation that σ CT implements σ + σ d . Since the probability of deadlock is 0, the action that players play in case of deadlock are irrelevant, so this approach works equally well for the AH approach and the default-move approach. It remains to show that, for each utility variant
. We start by showing that σ CT is t-resilient in Γ CT ( u ′ ). Given T with |T | ≤ t, τ T , and σ e , by Theorem 5.4, there exists a function H from strategies to strategies and σ ′ e such that, for all input profiles x, we have
for all players i. There also exists a scheduler of the form σ ′′ e such that
Since σ is t-immune, for all i / ∈ T we have
Therefore, σ CT is t-immune.
To show (strong) (k, t)-robustness, taking τ T , σ e , and σ ′ e as above, suppose that K is a set of players disjoint from T such that |K| ≤ k, and the players in K play τ K . Then, by Theorem 5.4, there exists σ * e such that
for all players i. By Corollary 6.
for some (resp., all) i ∈ K. For those i ∈ K for which this inequality holds, we have
It follows that σ CT is (strongly) (k, t)-robust in Γ CT ( u ′ ).
Proof of Theorem 4.2
The argument is essentially the same as that used for Theorem 4.1, except that we now use Theorem 5.5 instead of Theorem 5.4. By Theorem 5.5, for all ǫ ′ ∈ (0, 1], there exists a protocol σ CT that ǫ-(k + t)-bisimulates σ, ǫ-(k + t)-emulates σ, and uses O(nNc) messages in expectation. It follows that σ CT ǫ ′ -implements σ and has at most a probability ǫ ′ of deadlock. We show next that we can make ǫ ′ sufficiently small so that it becomes irrelevant if we work with the AH approach or the default-move approach.
We can now prove ǫ-(k, t)-robustness.
given a set T of players with |T | ≤ t, a strategy profile τ T for the players in T , and an environment strategy σ ′ e in the cheap-talk game, by Theorem 5.5, there exists a function H as in the definition of t-emulation. Moreover, for all inputs x, we can associate histories in the mediator game and histories in the cheap-talk game in such a way that the set of histories where the outcomes differ has probability at most ǫ ′ . Since all utilities are in the range [−M/2, M/2], by assumption, the maximum difference in utility between two outcomes in the underlying game is M. Thus, there exists an environment strategy σ ′ e such that for all input profiles x, we have
for all i ∈ T . Theorem 5.5 also guarantees that there exists an environment strategy σ ′′ e such that u
Since σ is ǫ-t immune in Γ d ( u ′ ), by Proposition 6.6, there exists a value ǫ 0 with 0 < ǫ 0 < ǫ such that u
If we take ǫ ′ = (ǫ − ǫ 0 )/2M, this shows that σ CT is (ǫ, t)-immune with both the AH approach and the default-move approach.
To show (strong) ǫ-(k, t)-robustness, keeping T , τ T , H, σ e , and σ ′ e as above, for all sets K of players disjoint from T with 1 ≤ |K| < k and strategy profiles τ K , there exists an environment strategy σ * e and a value ǫ 0 with 0 < ǫ 0 < ǫ such that for all input profiles x, u
for some (for all) i ∈ K. This shows that if we take ǫ ′ := (ǫ − ǫ 0 )/2M, then σ CT is ǫ-(k, t)-robust. Note that this argument works for both the AH approach and the default-move approach since it does not depend on the actions played in deadlock.
Proof of Theorem 4.4
The proof of Theorem 4.4 is similar in spirit to that of Theorem 4.1. The main problem we have to deal with is that of ensuring that rational players participate. To force participation, we have the honest players put the punishment strategy in their "wills", so that if σ CT ends in deadlock, the rational players will be punished. Unfortunately, a naive implementation of this approach does not work, as the following example shows.
Consider an underlying game Γ for n > 3k players where the set of actions is A := {0, 1, ⊥}. If at least k + 1 players play ⊥, all players get a payoff of 1.1; if k or fewer players play ⊥ and all players play either 0 or ⊥, then all players get a payoff of 1; if k or fewer players play ⊥ and all players play either ⊥ or 1, then all players get a payoff of 2; otherwise, all players get 0. Let Γ d be an extension of Γ with a mediator. Suppose that the mediator d uses the following strategy: First, d chooses a value b ∈ {0, 1} with equal probability. Then d chooses a ∈ {0, 1} with equal probability and sends the message a + bi (mod 2) to player i (note that the same a is used in all these messages). Finally, d sends the message "output b; STOP" to all players (so the strategy is in canonical form).
Let σ i be the strategy where player i ignores the message a+bi and plays b after receiving the message "output b". It is easy to check that σ is a k-resilient equilibrium in the mediator game, and gives players an expected payoff of 1.5. Moreover, playing ⊥ is a k-punishment strategy with respect to σ, since if all but k players play ⊥, then everyone gets a payoff of 1.1 (since at least k + 1 players play ⊥), which is less than 1.5.
The naive approach to implementing the mediator does not work for this game, at least with the punishment strategy ⊥. For example, suppose that after receiving the messages a + bi (mod 2), the rational players communicate with each other. Moreover, suppose that the set K of rational players includes i and j such that i − j is odd. Then the rational players can compute b. If b = 0, they actually prefer their payoff with the punishment strategy to their payoff with σ CT . Thus, they will stop sending messages. The simulation will not terminate, so the punishment strategy in the players' wills will be applied, making the rational players better off. Thus, we cannot simulate the mediator with this approach. Of course, there are punishment strategies in this game that would lead to cooperation (e.g., randomizing between 0 and 1). Nevertheless, this example shows that using an arbitrary punishment strategy may not suffice to force the rational players to cooperate.
The problem here is that the mediator tells each player i what a + bi is. We do not want the mediator to send such unnecessary information. But what counts as unnecessary? As we now show, for each strategy profile σ + σ d of a mediator game we can construct a strategy σ m + σ 
The intuition underlying f (σ d ) is that the mediator chooses an equivalence class in S det Γ d ,e / ∼, chooses an environment strategy σ e in the equivalence class, and simulates the outcome of ( σ + σ d , σ e ). In order to get an implementation, we must ensure that it is possible for f (σ d ) to choose all possible equivalences classes in S det Γ d ,e /∼. To do this, let R be the least integer such that (Rn)! ≥ |S det Γ d ,e /∼|. We show below that we can take R = 2 rn log(n) . The mediator σ d sends R messages to each player. As we shall see, this suffices for the mediator to choose all possible equivalence classes in S det Γ d ,e /∼. The strategy f (σ i ) is straightforward: player i initially sends the mediator the message (i, 0, x i ), where x i is i's input. Then for 1 ≤ r < R, after receiving a message with content r from the mediator, player i sends the mediator (i, r, x i ). When i receives a message of the form (STOP, a i ) from the mediator, i plays a i and halts.
The mediator f (σ d ) proceeds as follows: it sends each player i R − 1 messages, where the rth message just says "r". It then waits until there are at least n − k − t players from which it has received a valid and complete set of messages, where a set of messages from a player i is valid and complete if for all r with 0 ≤ r ≤ R − 1, the mediator has received exactly one message of the form (i, r, x), where x is an input value that i could have, and all the x values are the same in these R messages. The next time that the mediator is scheduled, it sends a STOP message to each player with an action to perform. We next explain how the mediator calculates which actions the players perform.
Let P be the set of players from whom the mediator has received a valid and complete of messages when it is next scheduled. There are two cases. If P consists of all players, this means that the mediator has received Rn messages. There are (Rn)! orders that these messages could have come in. Moreover, for each possible order of messages, there is a deterministic scheduler σ ′ e that delivers the messages in just this order. By choice of R,
′ |, so there is a surjective mapping H P from each message order to a scheduler σ e in the game Γ d . The mediator then simulates a computation of ( σ, σ d ) with the scheduler σ e corresponding to the message order it actually received (generating the randomness for all the players and for σ d ) using the input x that it received from the players, and sends each player i the action that results from this simulation as its Rth message. Now suppose P , the set of players from whom the mediator has received a valid and complete of messages when it is next scheduled, does not consist of all players. Let σ ′ P be a scheduler in the game Γ ′ d that resulted in this message order. Consider a fixed scheduler σ P in the game Γ d where the messages of all players not in P are delayed until after the mediator has sent all STOP messages. (There must be such a scheduler, since |P | ≥ n − k − t). Let x P be the profile of inputs that the mediator has received from the players in P , and extend it arbitrarily to an input profile x. The mediator f (σ d ) simulates a computation of ( σ, σ d ) with the scheduler σ P (again, generating the randomness for all the players and for σ d ) using some profile x that extends the profile x P it received from the players in P (it doesn't matter which vector x is used, since the mediator σ d does not receive messages from players not in P ), and sends each player i the action that results from this simulation as its Rth message.
If we require only weak implementation, we can make do with far fewer messages. Each player i just sends the mediator f (σ d ) an initial message of the form (i, x i ). The mediator waits until it has these initial messages from n − k − t players. If the mediator has received messages from the players in P when it is next scheduled, it simulates the mediator σ P on some input x that extends P .
We now show that this construction has the required properties.
Lemma 6.8. Given a finite mediator game Γ d that extends an underlying game Γ, a canonical strategy profile σ for the players, and a strategy σ d for the mediator in
Moreover, the number of messages sent in each history of
Proof. Implementation (resp. weakly implementation) follows from the construction. Suppose that σ + σ d is ǫ-(k, t)-robust (resp., strongly ǫ-(k, t)-robust, (k, t)-robust, strongly (k, t)-robust). We must show that f ( σ + σ d ) has the corresponding property. The proofs are essentially the same in all cases; moreover, the same argument works for both constructions (i.e., both the one the gives implementation and the one that gives weak implementation). For definiteness, we deal with ǫ-(k, t)-robustness here. We start by showing ǫ-t-immunity. If f ( σ + σ d ) is not ǫ-t-immune, then there must be scheduler σ ′ e , a set T of players with |T | ≤ t, a strategy τ T for the players in T , and an input profile x T that shows this. That is, for some i / ∈ T , we have
We can assume without loss of generality that σ ′ e is deterministic. Moreover, we can further assume without loss of generality that, when playing with τ , the malicious players deviate only by sending an input other than their actual input. All other deviations correspond to playing with a different (deterministic) scheduler. Specifically, since the mediator ignores all messages that are not sent by a player in the set P , the outcome is equivalent to playing with a scheduler that delays these messages until after the mediator sends its Rth message. And if a deviating player j does not send a message that it should send or sends a message late, we can just consider the scheduler that sends messages in the order that f (σ d ) actually received them. It now follows that there exists a scheduler σ ′′ e and an input profile x
. Also, by construction, there exists a scheduler σ e such that
for some scheduler σ e . Similarly, there exists a scheduler σ * e such that
T ) − ǫ. By Proposition 6.4, this contradicts the assumption that σ is ǫ-t-immune. Now let K be any subset disjoint from T such that 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k. Then, using an analogous argument, there exists a scheduler σ ′′′ e and an input profile x ′′ T such that
for all players i. There also exists a scheduler σ * * e and an input profile x ′′′ T such that
for all players i. Thus,
It remains to compute the bound on the number of messages sent. Clearly, if all we need is a weak implementation, then n messages suffice. In the case of implementation, at most 2Rn messages are sent (at most R by each player, and at most Rn by the mediator), where R is the least integer such that (Rn)! ≥ |S det Γ d ,e /∼|. Thus, we must compute an estimate for the number of equivalence of deterministic schedulers. A deterministic scheduler is a function from message patterns to a choice of message to be delivered, where a message pattern describes which messages have been sent so far, which were delivered, and the order that the messages were sent and delivered, but not the contents of the message. For example, taking (s, i, j, k) (resp., (d, i, j, k)) to denote the kth message sent by player i to player j (resp., that the kth message sent by player i to j is received by j), and taking the mediator to be player 0, then a typical message pattern might be (s, 0, 3, 1), (s, 1, 0, 1), (s, 0, 3, 2), (d, 0, 3, 2) is the message pattern where the mediator first send a message to player 3, then player 1 sends a message t the mediator, then the mediator sends a second message to player 3, and then then mediator's second message to player 3 is delivered. Given this message pattern, the scheduler can choose to deliver the mediator's first message to player 3 or the message from player 1 to the mediator. Since the mediator sends at most r messages to each player, and each player sends at most r messages to the mediator, message patterns have length at most 4rn. The messages sent by a player to the mediator are numbered consecutively, as are the messages sent by the mediator to each player. A straightforward computation then shows that there are at most (4rn)!/(r!) 2n message patterns of length 4rn. It is easy to see that there are fewer message patterns of length k for k < 4rn, so there are clearly at most (4rn)(4rn)!/(r!) 2n message patterns of length at most 4rn. A message pattern can have at most 2rn undelivered messages, so there are at most (2rn) (4rn)(4rn)!/(r!) 2n equivalence classes of schedulers. A straightforward application of Stirling's approximation formula (n! ∼ (n/e) n √ 2πn) shows that R = (4rn) 4rn suffices for our purposes. Since rn is a bound on the number of messages sent, we have N = rn, completing the proof.
Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that the players and mediator use such a strategy profile. We call f ( σ + σ d ) the minimally informative strategy corresponding to σ + σ d . More generally, we say that σ m + σ Since we consider only mediator games in canonical form, this guarantees termination for all honest players regardless of the strategy of rational and malicious players, provided that the scheduler is standard (i.e., not relaxed). However, once we allow relaxed schedulers, there is a possibility of deadlock. We assume for the purposes of the proof that we use the AH approach in the mediator game, and have the players play the punishment punishment strategy in their wills. Since σ CT guarantees t-cotermination for t < n/3, it follows that in the cheap-talk game, either all honest players terminate or all honest players play the punishment strategy. This guarantees that the players get the same payoff in corresponding histories in the mediator game and the cheap-talk game.
The next step in proving Theorem 4.4 is to show that rational players playing with a relaxed scheduler cannot get an expected payoff that is higher than their expected payoff when they play such a minimally informative (k, t)-robust equilibrium strategy with a nonrelaxed scheduler.
Proposition 6.9. If ǫ > 0, σ + σ d is a minimally informative (strongly) ǫ-(k, t)-robust equilibrium in a mediator game Γ d for which a (k + t)-punishment strategy exists, σ E is a relaxed scheduler, K and T are disjoint sets of players with 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k and |T | ≤ t, and τ (K∪T ) is a strategy profile for the players in K ∪ T , then there exists a value ǫ 0 < ǫ such that for all non-relaxed schedulers σ e and all input profiles x, we have that
, σ e , x T ) + ǫ 0 for some (for all) i / ∈ T .
To prove Proposition 6.9, we need a preliminary lemma that characterizes deadlocks in mediator games in canonical form with relaxed schedulers. It also shows that the scheduler can detect when such a deadlock happens. Lemma 6.10. A run in a mediator game in canonical form with a relaxed scheduler σ E ends in deadlock iff at some point in the run no player has received a STOP message and the scheduler does not deliver any of the messages not yet delivered.
Proof. Clearly, if no player has received a STOP messages and all the messages not yet delivered are never delivered, then the run ends in deadlock. To show that all deadlocks must be of this form, assume that a player receives eventually a STOP message. Then, since the mediator sent all STOP messages at the same time, all other players are guaranteed to receive a STOP message as well, given our assumption that a relaxed scheduler delivers either all or none of the messages sent at the same time.
Proof of Proposition 6.9. We can view the adversary's strategy ( τ (K∪T ) , σ E ) as a combination of (possibly infinitely many) deterministic strategies ( τ ′ (K∪T ) , σ ′ E ). Thus, it suffices to show the desired result for each of such deterministic strategies.
Let ( τ ′ (K∪T ) , σ ′ E ) be a deterministic strategy for the adversary in the support of ( τ (K∪T ) , σ E ). By the properties of our construction, the fact that the adversary is deterministic, and the fact that a relaxed scheduler must either deliver all the STOP messages from the mediator or deliver none, it follows that, for a given input x (K∪T ) , either all runs end in deadlock or all honest players terminate.
Suppose that for some deterministic adversary ( τ ′ (K∪T ) , σ ′ E ) and input x K∪T all honest players terminate. Consider a non-relaxed scheduler σ ′ e that acts just like σ ′ E , except that whenever it detects a deadlock (as characterized by Lemma 6.10, using the fact that the mediator's rth message to each player includes STOP), it instead delivers a message chosen at random. Then, σ To prove Theorem 4.5, we use an analogous strategy to that used to prove Theorem 4.4, using Theorem 5.5 instead of Theorem 5.4. The same argument as that used in the proof Theorem 4.2 shows that for all ǫ ′ ∈ (0, 1] there exists a protocol σ CT that ǫ ′ -implements σ + σ d and that σ CT is (ǫ, t)-immune.
To prove (strong) ǫ-(k, t)-robustness, fix an adversary A = ( τ K , τ T , σ e ) for subsets K, T such that 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k, |T | ≤ t and K ∩ T = ∅. By Theorem 5.5, there exists a function H from strategies to strategies and a relaxed scheduler σ E such that, for all input profiles x,
for some (resp. for all) i ∈ K. By Theorem 5.5, there exists a non-relaxed scheduler σ ′ e such that
Thus, we have that for some ǫ 0 < ǫ. Therefore, taking ǫ ′ := (ǫ − ǫ 0 )/2M, we have that σ CT is a (strongly) ǫ-(k, t)-robust equilibrium for Γ CT .
Again, as was the case for Theorem 4.4, with a little more effort we can show that under the conditions of Theorem 4.5, we can get a cheap-talk strategy that t-bisimulates and t-emulates a strategy in the mediator game.
